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MAsKed seMAnTic priMing As An 
index of AuToMATic processing
The effect of unconsciously perceived masked stimuli on 
the processing of subsequently presented visible stimuli 
is considered to be a prototypical example of an auto-
matic process because the influence of strategic process-
ing mechanisms can be ruled out. While the direct en-
gagement of strategic processing is very unlikely during 
conditions of unconscious perception, I will show later in 
this article that this does not exclude the possibility of 
indirect modulatory influences of top-down mechanisms 
on automatic processing. In this article, I will focus upon 
automatic processes elicited by unconsciously perceived 
stimuli because in conditions of unconscious perception 
it can be ensured that processing occurs ‘automatically’ 
without any contribution of intended, strategic process-
es. This does not preclude the possibility that consciously 
perceived stimuli can also trigger automatic processes 
(e.g.,  Hommel,  2000).  However,  for  consciously  per-
ceived  stimuli  it  is  difficult  to  rule  out  that  controlled 
processes also contribute (see also the classification of 
semantic priming mechanisms below).
AbsTrAcT
in  classical  theories  of  automaticity,  automatic 
processes  are  usually  thought  to  occur  autono-
mously  and  independently  of  higher  level  top-
down factors (e.g., posner & snyder, 1975). How-
ever, already neumann (1984) pointed out that 
the  cognitive  system  has  to  be  configured  in  a 
certain way for automatic processes to occur. in 
extension of his work, i propose a gating frame-
work  to  account  for  the  influence  of  top-down 
factors such as attention, intention and task set 
on automatic processes such as masked response 
or semantic priming. it is assumed that task rep-
resentations  held  in  prefrontal  cortex  regulate 
the gain of neurons in visual and sematic associa-
tion cortex thereby modulating the effects of un-
consciously perceived masked stimuli on further 
‘automatic’ information processing steps. in sup-
port of the postulated gating framework, recent 
studies  demonstrated  a  top-down  modulation 
of automatic processes. behavioral and electro-
physiological studies with the masked response 
priming  and  semantic  priming  paradigms  show 
that masked priming effects crucially depend (i) 
on temporal attention to the masked prime, (ii) 
on intentions or action plans and (iii) on the task 
set active immediately before masked prime pre-
sentation. for instance, masked semantic prim-
ing was only observed when the preceding task 
set  required  the  orientation  to  semantic  word   
features, but not when it required orientation to 
perceptual word features. These results support 
the  view  that  unconscious  automatic  processes 
are  modulated  by  top-down  factors.  They  are 
suggestive of a gating mechanism which orches-
trates the conscious and unconscious information 
processing streams.
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In this section, I will give a brief overview of the 
(masked) semantic priming paradigm and its applica-
tion to investigate automatic semantic processes be-
fore I move on to discuss top-down influences on auto-
matic processing. During the last decades, convincing 
evidence  has  been  accumulated  that  the  semantic 
meaning of masked words that cannot be consciously 
identified  is  activated  and  can  influence  processing 
of  subsequently  presented  stimuli  (semantic  prim-
ing; for an overview, see Kiefer, 2002a). While it is 
well  accepted  that  unconsciously  perceived  masked 
stimuli can prime an associated motor response (re-
sponse priming; see Klotz & Neumann, 1999; Vorberg, 
Mattler,  Heinecke,  Schmidt,  &  Schwarzbach,  2003), 
it has been questioned that unconsciously perceived 
masked stimuli are processed also at the level of se-
mantic meaning (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 
2001). However, a variety of studies using the seman-
tic  priming  paradigm,  which  is  not  compromised  by 
confounding  response  priming  effects,  have  reliably 
shown that semantic meaning is extracted from un-
consciously perceived stimuli (e.g., Carr & Dagenbach, 
1990; Kiefer, 2002b; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000; for se-
mantic priming during the attentional blink, see Rolke, 
Heil, Streb, & Henninghausen, 2001).
Complementary to response priming, the masked 
semantic  priming  paradigm  is  a  powerful  tool  to 
study the nature of unconscious perception and - as 
we  will  see  later  –  to  study  the  modulatory  effects 
on automatic processes for the following reasons: (i) 
Semantic  priming  rests  on  highly  overlearned  asso-
ciations between concepts, which have been acquired 
within a long period of time (Anderson & Bower, 1973). 
Response priming, in contrast, depends on the congru-
ency of stimulus-response (S-R) mappings established 
within the experiment or on the congruency of actions 
afforded  by  the  stimulus  (see  Ansorge,  Neumann, 
Becker, Kälberer, & Cruse, this volume; Kiesel, Kunde, 
& Hoffmann, this volume). Hence, automatic seman-
tic priming presumably involves relatively hard-wired 
processing  pathways  between  related  concepts. 
Response priming, in contrast, is based on response 
competition  evoked  by  the  (in)congruency  of  S-R 
mappings between prime and target (Klinger, Burton, 
& Pitts, 2000). (ii) Semantic priming differs from re-
sponse priming with regard to the underlying neural 
substrate. Semantic priming crucially depends on ar-
eas within the inferior and anterior ventro-medial tem-
poral lobe, which belong to the ventral visual pathway 
(Nobre & McCarthy, 1995). The ventral pathway has 
an important role in object identification and conscious 
vision in general (Milner & Goodale, 1995). Response 
priming, in contrast, involves occipito-parietal regions, 
which belong to the dorsal pathway (Ansorge et al., this 
volume,  Jaśkowski,  Skalska,  &  Verleger,  2003).  The 
dorsal pathway has been considered to be the neural 
substrate of unconscious visuo-motor processes sub-
serving motor responses such as grasping movements 
(Milner & Goodale, 1995). Given these differences in 
functional  neuroanatomy  between  semantic  priming 
and response priming, it is of great interest to assess 
whether unconscious automatic processes underlying 
both forms of priming are governed by the same set 
of computational principles (see also the discussion in 
the final section of this article).
Semantic priming generally refers to the facilitation 
of a response to a target stimulus (e.g., a word) by 
a meaningfully related prime stimulus (Neely, 1991). 
In the masked semantic priming procedure, conscious 
perception  of  the  prime  is  eliminated  by  displaying 
a pattern mask (e.g., a random sequence of letters) 
before and after the prime (for processes underlying 
masking, see for instance Scharlau, 2007, in this is-
sue). Unconscious semantic activation is demonstrated 
when the masked prime word facilitates the process-
ing of the target stimulus. Semantic priming has been 
frequently observed in lexical decision tasks in which 
subjects have to decide whether a target word (e.g., 
“lemon”) is a real word or a pseudoword. Reactions 
are faster and more accurate if a semantically related 
prime word (e.g., “sour”) precedes the target in com-
parison to a condition in which an unrelated word (e.g., 
“house”) precedes the target.
Two general cognitive mechanisms have been pro-
posed  to  underlie  semantic  priming  effects:  Firstly, 
unconscious  automatic  spreading  of  activation  and 
secondly,  conscious  strategic  semantic  processing 
(Posner & Snyder, 1975). According to the first cogni-
tive mechanism, semantic priming reflects the auto-
matic spread of activation in semantic networks. The 
presentation of a prime stimulus is thought to activate 
the corresponding conceptual representation in a se-
mantic  network,  and  activation  spreads  to  semanti-
cally related nodes, hereby increasing their activation 
level. Hence, if a word denoting a related concept is 
presented, its recognition is facilitated. According to 
Posner and Snyder (1975) automatic spread of activa-
tion does not depend on capacity-limited attentional 
processes. In contrast, according to the second class 
of cognitive mechanisms (strategic semantic process-
ing), semantic priming is the result of controlled at-
tentional processes such as semantic matching or se-
mantic expectation (for an overview, see Neely, 1991). 
By definition, strategic semantic processing depends Top-down modulation of ‘automatic’ processes 
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on  capacity-limited  attentional  resources  (Posner  & 
Snyder, 1975).
With visible prime stimuli, both automatic spread-
ing activation and controlled priming processes usu-
ally contribute. For strategic semantic processing to 
occur, subjects must be aware of the presentation of 
the prime stimulus, semantic priming elicited by un-
consciously perceived masked words exclusively arises 
from  automatic  spreading  activation.  Behavioural 
masked semantic priming effects have been reliably 
demonstrated in several studies (e.g., Kiefer, 2002b; 
Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; Marcel, 1983).
In addition to behavioural methods, semantic proc-
esses can also be studied with event-related brain po-
tentials (ERPs), which have the advantage to capture 
cognitive processes online with a temporal resolution 
in the range of milliseconds and have been frequently 
shown to be more sensitive than behavioural measures 
(for a discussion, see Kiefer & Brendel, 2006). In ERP 
research on semantic processing, semantic priming ef-
fects are reflected by an amplitude modulation of the 
N400 ERP component. The N400 is a negative ERP de-
flection over the centro-parietal scalp, which specifically 
reflects semantic processing (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). 
Studies using intracranial electrodes have suggested 
a generator in the anterior fusiform gyrus (Nobre & 
McCarthy, 1995). The significance of this brain area 
for semantic memory processes has also been shown 
in  neuroimaging  studies  (e.g.,  Vandenberghe,  Price, 
Wise, Josephs, & Frackowiak, 1996).
The N400 has been shown to be sensitive to seman-
tic deviations with larger amplitudes for semantically 
incongruent words compared to congruent words at 
both the sentence (e.g., Friederici, Hahne, & Mecklinger, 
1996; Kutas & Hillyard, 1984) and the word level (e.g., 
Bentin, McCarthy, & Wood, 1985; Kiefer, 2001, 2005). 
Using  semantic  priming  paradigms,  N400  amplitude 
to targets is attenuated for semantically related word 
pairs compared to unrelated word pairs, the so called 
N400 priming effect (e.g., Bentin, McCarthy, & Wood, 
1985;  Holcomb  &  Neville,  1990;  Kiefer,  Weisbrod, 
Kern, Maier, & Spitzer, 1998). There is evidence that 
the N400 potential is reliably modulated by masked 
words, which were not consciously perceived (Deacon, 
Hewitt, Chien-Ming, & Nagata, 2000; Kiefer, 2002b; 
Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000) and by words which were not 
available for report because they are presented during 
the attentional blink (Luck, Vogel, & Shapiro, 1996; 
Rolke,  Heil,  Streb,  &  Henninghausen,  2001;  Vogel, 
Luck, & Shapiro, 1998). The results of these recent 
studies suggest that the N400 modulation also reflects 
automatic spread of activation. 
These findings are in contrast to results from some 
earlier studies, which suggested that N400 amplitude is 
exclusively modulated by strategic semantic process-
ing.  In  fact,  there  is  some  evidence  that  conscious 
or attentive processing of the prime is a prerequisite 
for N400 priming effects (for a review, see Deacon & 
Shelley-Tremblay, 2000): In an earlier masked prim-
ing study by Brown and Hagoort (1993), N400 prim-
ing effects were only obtained for visible, but not for 
masked primes, although behavioural priming effects 
were obtained in both conditions. N400 priming effects 
were found in a dichotic listening task for attended, 
but  not  for  ignored  prime  words  (Bentin,  Kutas,  & 
Hillyard, 1995). Finally, N400 priming effects were ob-
tained only when an orienting task required semantic 
processing of the prime, but not when the task asked 
for visual processing of word features (Chwilla, Brown, 
& Hagoort, 1995). Hence, these studies suggest that 
attentive orientation to the prime is a prerequisite for 
N400 priming effects to occur. 
It has been proposed that masked N400 priming 
effects strongly depend on the interval between the 
onset of the prime word and the target (stimulus onset 
asynchrony, SOA) and that the use of the long SOA of 
500 ms in the Brown and Hagoort (1993) study is one 
possible explanation for their failure to detect masked 
N400 priming effects (Deacon, Hewitt, Chien-Ming, & 
Nagata, 2000; Kiefer, 2002b; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000). 
In fact, when varying the SOA systematically, Kiefer 
and Spitzer (2000) found masked N400 priming ef-
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figure 1. 
ERP priming effects. Absolute mean voltage difference be-
tween semantically unrelated and related word pairs (ERP 
priming effects) in the N400 time window at centro-pari-
etal electrodes as a function of masking and prime-target 
SOA. Potentials were collapsed across hemispheres. This 
figure shows the qualitatively different time courses for un-
masked and masked N400 priming effects (after Kiefer and 
Spitzer, 2000).292
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fects at an SOA of 67 ms, but not at an SOA of 200 ms. 
Unmasked N400 priming effects, in contrast, increased 
at the longer SOA (see Figure 1). This study shows 
that masked priming on the N400 ERP component can 
be  obtained  provided  that  prime  and  target  stimuli 
appear in close succession, but decays rapidly within 
about 200 ms.
In a further study, Kiefer (2002b) took several meas-
ures to ensure that behavioural and N400 masked se-
mantic priming effects indeed reflect unconscious auto-
matic processes and are not compromised by conscious 
prime  identification.  In  the  first  experiment,  masked 
priming  effects  were  related  to  recognition  accuracy 
in a masked prime identification test (lexical decision 
on masked words and pseudowords) using a regres-
sion approach similar to that of Greenwald, Draine, and 
Abrams (1996). Kiefer (2002b) did not find a positive 
relation between the magnitude of priming effects and 
masked prime identification, thus ruling out the pos-
sibility that masked priming effects were contaminated 
by  conscious  prime  identification.  In  fact,  as  can  be 
seen in Figure 2, the correlation was clearly negative 
for behavioural priming effects suggesting that prim-
ing effects were greater the less conscious information 
could be obtained from the masked words (for a similar 
effect, see Carr & Dagenbach, 1990). 
A negative correlation between d’ and the behavioral 
effect does not necessarily indicate that less discrimi-
nation abilities translate into stronger priming effects 
because large negative d’ values could indicate inverse 
response mapping. It should be noted however that in 
this study d’ were distributed around zero and negative 
values were small. Nevertheless, the correlation with 
priming  was  negative.  For  that  reason,  the  negative 
values most likely reflect a random distribution around 
zero rather than inverse mapping of discriminated fea-
tures.
In the second experiment, it was assessed whether 
masked stimuli could be recognised at the visual, lexical 
and semantic level and whether backward priming from 
the target to the prime had rendered the masked words 
partially recognisable. For instance, participants could 
have correctly completed the partially recognized prime 
word “t_ _ le” (“table”) in the context of the semanti-
cally related target word “chair”. To this end, subjects 
were  required  to  perform  decisions  on  visual,  lexical 
and semantic features of masked words presented with 
Table 1. 
Identification measures for the masked stimuli as a function of task and semantic context (standard deviations in parenthe-
ses). Table after Kiefer (2002b).
lexical decision
without context
lexical decision
with context
visual discrimination
with context semantic judgment
Average accuracy
in %
50.8 (4.4)
range 43.8 - 63.8
49.4 (2.9)
range 44.4 - 56.3
49.9 (2.4)
range 44.4 - 53.8
51.9 (5.7)
range 44.4 - 65.0
Average d‘ 0 (.42)
range -1.34- .74
related: -.15 (.37)
range -1.34 - .42
unrelated: 0 (.24)
range  -.42 - .39
related: 0 (.25)
range  -.55 - .39
unrelated: 0 (.16)
range  -.32 - .39
.14 (.36) 
range  -.41 - .89
prime visibility
d’ -1.4 -1.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
N400 priming
µV
B
figure 2. 
Plots of (A) masked behavioral and (B) masked parietal 
N400 priming effects as a function of the sensitivity meas-
ure d’ in the masked visibility test. The plots also show the 
linear regression function (after Kiefer, 2002b).
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or without semantically related context words. Subjects 
performed at chance level in all tasks (see Table 1). 
Most importantly, performance did not differ depending 
on whether the context word was related to the prime 
or not. These results exclude the possibility that back-
ward priming has rendered the masked words partially 
visible.
clAssicAl And refined  
THeories of AuToMATiciTy
So far, I have shown that semantic meaning can be 
extracted from unconsciously perceived masked words 
in an automatic fashion. In this section, I will review 
different theories on the nature of automatic process-
es.  Unconscious  ‘automatic’1  processes  are  typically 
thought  to  be  elicited  autonomously  and  independ-
ently of any cognitive resources and intentions (Posner 
& Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). In clas-
sical theories of attentional control and automaticity, 
automatic processes are considered to be independent 
of capacity-limited attention in contrast to controlled 
processes (Posner & Snyder, 1975): Controlled proc-
esses are proposed (i) to depend on capacity-limited 
attentional resources, (ii) to interfere with other proc-
esses, (iii) to be executable only serially, and (iv) to 
be conscious. In contrast, it is assumed that automatic 
processes  (i)  do  not  depend  on  capacity-limited  at-
tentional resources, (ii) are not prone to interference 
with other processes, (iii) can work in parallel, and (iv) 
are unconscious (for a review, see Neumann, 1984). 
Hence, unlike controlled processes automatic process-
es are considered to be entirely autonomous from the 
configuration of the information processing system.
Neumann (1984) questioned these classical defining 
criteria of automatic processes. Instead, he proposed 
that  automatic  processes  depend  on  a  person’s  cur-
rent intentions and direction of attention. Furthermore, 
Neumann (1984) argued that automatic processes are 
prone to interference from other processes to some ex-
tent. Neumann (1984) assumed that the cognitive sys-
tem has to be configured in a certain way or, as he calls 
it, “a variety of process parameters have to be specified 
for automatic processes to occur”. In his theory of direct 
parameter specification (DPS), which aims at explain-
ing  unconscious  response  priming,  Neumann  (1990) 
argues that participants’ search for information in order 
to specify free parameters within the currently active 
intention/action  plan.  Unconsciously  registered  infor-
mation that resembles this searched-for information is 
selected and processed to specify the free processing 
parameters. Hence, according to DPS theory, masked 
response priming effects should depend on participants’ 
current intentions and action plans (for corresponding 
evidence see below).
The role of attention for eliciting automatic priming 
processes is also emphasized by Naccache, Blandin, and 
Dehaene (2002). They propose that automatic priming 
depends on a temporal window of attention which is 
open for a few hundreds of milliseconds when subjects 
focus their attention on the predicted time point of the 
appearance of a stimulus. Temporal attention is assumed 
to amplify the processing of the masked primes even if 
they are not consciously perceived. This top-down atten-
tional amplification of unconsciously perceived masked 
primes enhances, in turn, the elicited automatic proc-
esses (see also Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). Naccache, 
Blandin, and Dehaene (2002) conclude that the concept 
of ‘automaticity’ has to be refined since unconscious, 
automatic processes appear to be modulated by top-
down strategic control (for empirical evidence, see the 
section below). However, unconscious processing of the 
prime is automatic inasmuch as it cannot serve as a 
source of information for determining strategic process-
ing steps (Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995).
In line with Neumann (1984) and Naccache, Blandin, 
and Dehaene (2002), I assume that attention and inten-
tions configure the cognitive/neural system in a specific 
way (Kiefer & Brendel, 2006). A given attentional (or 
intentional) state might be necessary for unconscious 
stimuli to trigger further processes. These processes are 
not under intentional control once initiated and in that 
sense automatic (for a taxonomy of unconscious auto-
matic processes, see Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, 
Sackur, & Sergent, 2006). The proposed role of top-
down attentional influences on unconscious automatic 
processing can indirectly be derived from a model of 
visual masking (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; Enns & 
Di Lollo, 2000), which is based on re-entrant processing 
of visual stimuli. Di Lollo and Enns propose that visual 
stimuli are processed in a recurrent fashion in visual 
brain areas (V1, V2, V4 etc.): Activity in early visual ar-
eas is propagated to higher level areas and fed back to 
early visual areas (re-entrant processing). A conscious 
percept  of  the  stimulus  is  achieved  when  re-entrant 
processing of a stimulus results in a stable activation 
pattern after several processing cycles.
As the mask interferes with the processing of the stim-
ulus, a stable activation pattern is never reached even 
after many processing cycles. Enns and Di Lollo (2000) 
suggest that in addition to the amount of interference 
caused by competing stimuli (i.e., masks) attention is 
a crucial factor for whether or not re-entrant process-
ing leads to a stable activation pattern representing the 294
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stimulus. Attention is thought to amplify the activation 
of the stimulus representation irrespective of whether 
or not a stable representation is achieved after several 
processing cycles. I therefore propose that attention is 
able to enhance the processing of both consciously and 
unconsciously perceived stimuli. In support of this view, 
Kentridge, Heywood, and Weiskrantz (2004) observed 
in patients with blindsight that spatial cueing improved 
discrimination  performance  without  awareness  (see 
also Kentridge, Heywood, & Weiskrantz, 1999). Thus, 
attention  and  conscious  experience  are  functionally 
independent to some extent and should not be equat-
ed  as  some  authors  do  (Merikle  &  Joordens,  1997; 
Velmans, 1991). Attention is obviously a prerequisite 
for conscious perception (Enns & Di Lollo, 2000; for a 
discussion also see Kiefer, 2002a). However, as argued 
here, allocation of attention might also be necessary for 
unconscious stimuli to trigger automatic processes.
Top-down ModulATion  
of AuToMATic processes:  
A gATing frAMeworK
In this section, I want to expand the notion of a top-
down modulation of automatic processes. In particu-
lar,  I  propose  that  automatic  processes,  which  can 
be  elicited  by  both  consciously  and  unconsciously 
perceived stimuli, and controlled processes only act-
ing upon consciously perceived stimuli are modulated 
by  similar  top-down  influences.  However,  top-down 
modulation  of  processes  elicited  by  consciously  and 
unconsciously  perceived  stimuli  presumably  differs 
with  regard  to  its  temporal  onset.  As  suggested  by 
Ansorge and Horstmann (2007) I distinguish between 
two types of top-down control: preemptive and reac-
tive  control.  In  preemptive  control,  top-down  influ-
ences are set up in advance of stimulus presentation. 
Preemptive control can be exerted for both conscious 
and unconscious stimulus presentation. However, only 
consciously perceived stimuli are susceptible to reac-
tive control in response to ongoing or completed stim-
ulus processing. For that reason, conscious ‘strategic’ 
stimulus processing allows for a greater adaptability 
and  flexibility  of  top-down  control  than  unconscious 
‘automatic’ processing although both forms of proc-
esses share basic principles of top-down modulation. 
Given that automatic processes depend on the con-
figuration of the cognitive system, one may also speak 
of  “conditional  automaticity”  (Bargh,  1989;  Logan, 
1989) because automatic processes are not entirely 
bottom-up and stimulus driven, but are susceptible to 
top-down modulation.
As outlined in the previous section, refined theories 
of automaticity suggest that the cognitive system has to 
be configured in a certain way for automatic processes 
to occur. The DPS theory (Neumann, 1990) suggests 
that attention, intentions, and task goals specify the 
necessary “parameters” within the information process-
ing system so that an unconscious stimulus suffices to 
specify the remaining “free” parameters and to trigger a 
prepared response. But how could the “specification of 
process parameters” be implemented in a more formal, 
neuronally plausible mechanism? How could the notion 
of “parameter specification” be re-formulated in a more 
general way so that this concept is applicable not only 
to visuo-motor response preparation, but also to other 
domains such as semantic processing?
In the research on attention, the modulatory influ-
ences of attention on sensory processes are frequently 
assumed to be realised by a gating mechanism which 
enhances  some  processes  while  blocking  others 
(Hamker,  2005).  Attentional  control  is  thought  to  be 
exerted by dorsolateral prefrontal areas, which medi-
ate  the  representation  of  task-relevant  information 
(i.e.,  task-relevant  stimulus  dimensions,  spatial  loca-
tion, and temporal information of a stimulus). Sensory 
processing can be modulated by attention through far 
reaching neural connections from prefrontal areas to 
posterior brain areas (occipital and temporal cortex), 
in which the different stimulus dimensions are percep-
tually processed. Processing of task-relevant stimulus 
information  is  facilitated  whereas  processing  of  task-
irrelevant information is blocked. This can be modeled 
by increasing the “gain” of neurons in brain areas which 
process  task-relevant  stimulus  information  while  de-
creasing the gain of neurons in other areas (e.g., Cohen 
& Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Hamker, 2005). The gain is 
a parameter in neural network modeling which influ-
ences the probability that a neuron fires at a given acti-
vation level. If the gain is high the likelihood of firing is 
increased in comparison to a low gain. Through regulat-
ing the gain of sensory neurons, prefrontal areas could 
enhance sensory processing of task-relevant stimulus 
information  and  block  the  processing  of  task-irrel-
evant information. Electrophysiological animal studies, 
in which single or multiple cell activity was recorded, 
found neural response properties which are in line with 
the  notion  of  an  attentional  gain  control  mechanism 
(Treue & Martínez Trujillo, 1999). The concept of gating 
by gain modulation introduced so far does not include 
a  mechanism  which  actively  inhibits  task-irrelevant 
information. Instead, processing of task-irrelevant in-
formation is merely blocked (i.e. not carried out) by 
decreasing the gain in the corresponding neurons. The Top-down modulation of ‘automatic’ processes 
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notion of blocking of information processing is in line 
with the available evidence presented below in the next 
section. To date, evidence does not support an active 
top-down inhibition of task-irrelevant processing path-
ways. For the sake of parsimony and due to the lack of 
supporting evidence, gating is solely realized through 
gain control in the proposed framework. Future work is 
clearly necessary to further elucidate the fine-grained 
details of the gating mechanism.
Similar  to  the  present  proposal,  Stolz  and  Besner 
(1996)  modeled  within  a  connectionist  network  the 
influence of task sets on (unmasked) semantic prim-
ing effects (for the influence of task sets on semantic 
priming, see also the next section). In their model, a 
semantic layer is reciprocally connected with a lexical 
layer.  Semantic  priming  occurs  when  activity  in  the 
semantic  layer  is  fed-back  to  the  lexical  layer.  They 
assume that a perceptual task orientation towards the 
prime (e.g., a letter search) blocks spreading activation 
from the semantic to the lexical layer hereby reducing 
or eliminating semantic priming effects.
Gating mechanisms have been originally proposed 
for  explaining  effects  of  attention  on  the  processing 
of  visible  stimuli  which  enter  conscious  awareness. 
However,  the  gating  mechanism  could  also  apply  to 
unconscious  perception  and  automatic  processing. 
In particular, it can be used to model the modulatory 
effects of attention, intention and task sets on ‘auto-
matic’ processes as suggested by refined theories of 
automaticity.  I  propose  that  the  configuration  of  the 
cognitive system (or parameter setting) by attention, 
intention, and task sets is achieved by a similar kind 
of gating mechanism as suggested for conscious per-
ception (see Figure 3). This gating mechanism orches-
trates the information processing streams in congru-
ency with the current task-representations even when 
perception is unconscious and processes are automatic. 
Unconsciously perceived masked stimuli can only trig-
ger specific automatic processes (e.g., semantic prim-
ing) if the current task information held in prefrontal 
cortex gates the corresponding information processing 
pathway in posterior (semantic) brain areas. Otherwise, 
Task-relevant
stimulus information
Task-congruent
processing pathway
Task-incongruent
processing pathways
Task representation
(Prefrontal cortex)
Stimulus representation
(Occipito-temporal cortex)
figure 3. 
Outline of the gating framework. Task information (relevant stimulus dimensions, spatial and temporal stimulus information etc.) 
held in prefrontal areas modulates the gain of neurons in sensory areas through far reaching connections. Hereby, processing 
pathways in congruency with the represented task information are enhanced while other processing pathways are inhibited.296
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if the gating mechanism emphasizes other processing 
pathways, unconsciously perceived stimuli will not be 
able to elicit further ‘automatic’ processing. In line with 
the re-defined theories of automaticity described in the 
previous  section,  processes  elicited  by  unconsciously 
perceived stimuli are automatic in the sense that they 
are not susceptible to top-down modulation or correc-
tion  once  the  process  has  started  (reactive  control). 
Automatic  processes  can  only  be  influenced  by  top-
down modulation through gating before the process has 
started  (preemptive  control):  The  gating  mechanism 
can configure the system in such a way that uncon-
sciously perceived stimuli can elicit further processing 
steps in specific brain areas or it can block these proc-
esses. Of course, as the eliciting stimuli themselves are 
unconsciously perceived, top-down modulation cannot 
be exerted intentionally in deliberate anticipation of the 
stimuli (e.g., the masked prime in a masked priming 
paradigm).  Instead,  top-down  modulation  is  induced 
indirectly  by  previous  reactions,  current  intentions, 
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Schematic depiction of sample congruent and incongruent trials (a) and response times for the three conditions (b) in Experiment 
1 of the Naccache et al. (2002) study. The motor response was congruent when the prime and the target numbers were both 
either greater than 5 or less than 5; if one was greater than 5 and the other was less than 5, they were incongruent. Response 
priming effects were only obtained when the target was presented after a fixed time interval (after Naccache et al., 2002).Top-down modulation of ‘automatic’ processes 
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stimuli, or task instructions and has to be set up in ad-
vance of stimulus presentation. According to my view, 
the possibility of (i) intended (ii) reactive (in response 
to  ongoing  or  completed  stimulus  processing)  top-
down  modulation  remains  to  be  the  most  prominent 
distinguishing feature between – what one might still 
call – controlled and automatic processes. In the next 
section, I describe studies which provide evidence for a 
top-down modulation of automatic processes elicited by 
unconsciously perceived stimuli.
evidence for Top-down  
ModulATion of AuToMATic 
processes
In  the  first  two  studies  reviewed  in  this  section, 
the modulatory influence of temporal attention on 
automatic processes was investigated. These stud-
ies show that allocation of temporal attention is a 
prerequisite  for  automatic  priming  to  occur.  In  all 
masked priming studies described in the first sec-
tion of this article, subjects typically attended to the 
stimulation stream during the time windows of prime 
and target presentation. For that reason these earlier 
studies are not suitable to assess the influence of at-
tention on automatic processes. Naccache, Blandin, 
and Dehaene (2002) manipulated in a numerical re-
sponse priming paradigm the allocation of temporal 
attention to the target. In this paradigm (Dehaene 
et al., 1998), subjects were instructed to compare 
target numbers to a fixed reference of five. Numbers 
smaller and larger than five were assigned to dif-
ferent response hands. Subjects were faster when 
the masked prime and the target number fell on the 
same side of five, and therefore called for the same 
motor response than when they called for a different 
response (response priming effect, see also Vorberg, 
Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003). 
In order to manipulate the allocation of temporal at-
tention, Naccache et al. (2002) presented subjects 
with  a  continuous  stream  of  visual  masks  within 
which the primes and targets appeared at varying 
time  points  after  trial  onset.  They  compared  the 
amount of priming on the same trials, depending on 
whether the time of target occurrence was blocked, 
and therefore predictable (implicit cueing), or vari-
able,  and  therefore  unpredictable  (Experiment  1). 
They found response priming effects only when the 
onset of the target was predictable (Figure 4). In two 
more experiments temporal attention was explicitly 
cued, yielding identical results as with the implicit 
cuing procedure.
The Naccache et al. (2002) study provides supportive 
evidence for an attentional modulation of unconscious, 
automatic  processes,  but  also  has  some  limitations. 
First of all, attention was only cued to the appearance 
of the target. As primes and targets were presented in 
close temporal proximity, the prime also was attended 
to. However, attention to the prime and to the target 
is confounded. Therefore, the conclusion that temporal 
attention enhanced response priming effects by ampli-
fying processing of the masked prime is not warranted, 
and the alternative interpretation that attentional en-
hancement of the target is a prerequisite for masked re-
sponse priming cannot be ruled out. Secondly, Naccache 
et al. (2002) investigated the effects of temporal atten-
tion on response priming. It has been debated in the 
response priming literature whether masked response 
priming effects are mainly due to direct motor specifi-
cations without mediation through semantic processes 
(Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001). For this 
reason, it is unclear whether the Naccache et al. (2002) 
results also hold for semantic priming. There is at least 
some evidence that unconscious behavioural semantic 
priming does not depend on spatial attention (Fuentes, 
Carmona, & Agis, 1994). However, this previous study 
only assessed behavioural priming, but did not record 
ERPs,  so  that  it  is  open  whether  neurophysiological 
measures would be more sensitive to detect top-down 
attentional  modulation  of  unconscious,  automatic  se-
mantic priming.
Kiefer and Brendel (2006) set up a masked semantic 
priming paradigm, using ERPs to test whether temporal 
attention to the masked primes modulates behavioural 
and  N400  priming  effects.  For  the  masked  semantic 
priming  paradigm,  we  adopted  the  design  from  our 
earlier studies (Kiefer, 2002b; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000): 
Subjects performed lexical decisions on target stimuli 
(words  and  pseudowords),  which  were  preceded  by 
briefly  presented  (33.5  ms)  masked  prime  words, 
which could not be consciously identified. In order to 
track the time course of masked priming, the prime-
target SOA was either short (67 ms) or long (200 ms). 
In the first experiment, a cuing procedure was applied 
(see Figure 5) in order to prompt subjects to attend 
to the stimulation stream of masks either during the 
time window of masked prime presentation (short cue 
prime interval, CPI: 200 ms; plus 200 ms cue dura-
tion) or 1 s before masked prime presentation (long 
CPI: 800 ms; plus 200 ms cue duration). Filler trials 
with an intermediate CPI induced smoother transitions 
between trial lengths. In the long CPI condition, as a 
long period of time, during which the stimulation did not 
change, had elapsed after cue presentation, subjects 298
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should have disengaged temporal attention when the 
masked prime is finally presented. The combinations 
of CPI/SOA conditions were presented in a randomized 
sequence in order to prevent subjects from predicting 
the occurrence of the prime. Thus, in contrast to the 
Naccache et al. (2002) study, attention to the masked 
prime, not attention to the target, was manipulated. A 
second experiment was set up to control for whether 
possible interactions between masked priming and CPI 
did depend on attentional cuing to the prime or were 
merely the result of the different trial lengths. In this 
control  experiment,  the  experimental  procedure  was 
the same except that participants were instructed to 
focus on the lexical decision on the target while the cue 
stimulus  was  not  task-relevant.  Analysis  of  reactions 
times showed that the manipulation of temporal atten-
tion to the prime in the first experiment was successful. 
In this experiment, in which the cue was task-relevant, 
slower reactions to the target in the short CPI condition 
demonstrated that participants focused attention to the 
stimulation stream immediately following cue presenta-
tion and had to re-allocate attention when the target 
was presented. In contrast, in the control experiment, 
in which the cue was task-irrelevant, we did not observe 
any RT differences as a function of the CPI.
Kiefer and Brendel (2006) found that masked N400 
priming effects had an earlier onset and were stronger 
in amplitude when primes were presented within the 
attended time window (short CPI) and when the prime-
target SOA was short (67 ms) compared to the other 
conditions (Experiment 1). At the long SOA of 200 ms 
and when the prime was unattended (long CPI), the 
onset of the masked priming effect was delayed and 
N400 priming was generally smaller than in the short 
SOA/short CPI condition (see Figure 6). In Experiment 
2, when subjects were instructed to focus upon the tar-
get, masked N400 priming was generally reduced such 
that it did not reach statistical significance at all. Taken 
together, this study provides strong evidence that at-
tention to an unconsciously perceived masked stimulus 
is a prerequisite for N400 ERP priming effects to occur. 
The data therefore support the view that unconsciously 
perceived masked stimuli require attentional amplifica-
tion to elicit automatic processes (Dehaene & Naccache, 
2001; Naccache et al. 2002). It should be noted that in 
earlier masked priming studies (Deacon et al., 2000; 
figure 5. 
Temporal sequence of one trial of the temporal cueing procedure. The masked prime word was presented either 200 ms or 800 
ms following a cue, which prompted subjects to attend to the stimulation stream (after Kiefer and Brendel, 2006).Top-down modulation of ‘automatic’ processes 
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Kiefer, 2002b; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000), in which masked 
N400  priming  effects  were  obtained,  participants  at-
tended to the prime because the prime was presented 
shortly  after  the  fixation  cross  and  in  close  temporal 
proximity to the target.
Kiefer and Brendel (2006) were able to identify two 
important  boundary  conditions  for  obtaining  reliable 
N400 priming effects: prime-target SOA and attention 
to the prime. Whatever the precise semantic process 
is that is indexed by N400 amplitude modulation, e.g., 
automatic spread of activation in semantic networks, it 
also occurs under automatic processing conditions (in 
addition  to  strategic  processing  conditions).  However, 
automatic  semantic  processing  decays  fast  over  time 
when elicited by masked stimuli and requires temporal 
attention to the eliciting stimulus.
The boundary conditions for masked N400 priming 
effects  identified  in  this  study  may  help  to  reconcile 
some discrepant findings in the literature regarding the 
processing nature of the N400. On the one hand, N400 
amplitude has been shown to be modulated by uncon-
sciously perceived masked words (Deacon et al., 2000; 
Kiefer, 2002b; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000) and by words not 
available for verbal report during the attentional blink 
(Luck,  Vogel,  &  Shapiro,  1996;  Rolke,  Heil,  Streb,  & 
Henninghausen, 2001; Vogel, Luck, & Shapiro, 1998), 
suggesting that the N400 ERP component is sensitive to 
automatic priming processes. On the other hand, N400 
priming effects have only been found for attended, but 
not  for  ignored  prime  words  (e.g.,  Bentin,  Kutas,  & 
Hillyard, 1995; Kellenbach & Michie, 1996). These lat-
ter findings have been taken as evidence that the N400 
only reflects strategic post-lexical matching processes, 
but not automatic priming (e.g., automatic spreading of 
activation). The Kiefer and Brendel (2006) data allows 
to resolve this discrepancy. The observation of atten-
tional modulation of unconscious masked N400 priming 
effects demonstrates that also automatic and not only 
strategic N400 priming requires that participants attend 
to the prime stimulus.
Automatic priming does not only depend on temporal 
attention, but also on intentions and task sets, which 
are active during the presentation of the masked prime. 
In line with Rogers and Monsell (1995), I define task 
sets as an adaptive configuration of the cognitive sys-
tem which is necessary to efficiently perform a given 
task  (see  also Gilbert  &  Shallice,  2002). The concept 
of a “task set” is related to that of “intention”, but is 
more specific because it refers to the immediate com-
putational  consequences  of  pursuing  a  current  goal 
during task performance. The concept of “intention” is 
broader because it additionally includes the conscious 
representation of the goal and the subjective state of 
commitment to perform a goal-related action (Ansorge 
& Neumann, 2005; Goschke, 2002).
For response priming, it is meanwhile well document-
ed that response congruency effects (prime and target 
share the same or different responses) critically depend 
on  participants’  intentions  and  expectations.  Ansorge 
and colleagues (Ansorge, Heumann, & Scharlau, 2002; 
Ansorge & Neumann, 2005) showed in several studies 
that  unconsciously  perceived  masked  primes  trigger 
responses only to the extent that they match currently 
active  intentions  of  a  person.  When  task  instructions 
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figure 6. 
Attentional modulation of ERP priming effects. Mean voltages from centro-parietal electrodes in the time window (A) of the de-
scending N400 (200-399) and (B) of the N400 peak (400-599 ms) as a function the cue prime interval (CPI) and prime-target 
SOA (Experiment 1). Voltages were collapsed across electrode sites. In both time windows N400 priming effects were largest 
at the short CPI/short SOA condition demonstrating an attentional modulation of masked semantic priming (after Kiefer and 
Brendel, 2006).300
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where  changed  in  such  a  way  that  primes  ceased  to 
be  task-relevant,  priming  effects  were  abolished.  For 
instance,  black-coloured  primes  elicited  a  response 
congruency effect on reactions to the target if the tar-
get was also shown in black colour. In contrast, when 
participants  had  to  respond  to  red-coloured  targets, 
black-coloured primes did not influence reaction times 
to  the  target  anymore.  In  line  with  the  DPS  theory, 
Ansorge and Neumann (2005) argue that masked re-
sponse priming effects depend on the formation of ac-
tion plans: Participants search for information in order 
to specify free parameters within the currently active 
intention/action  plan.  Unconsciously  registered  infor-
mation that resembles this searched-for information is 
selected and processed to specify the free processing 
parameters.  Therefore,  unconsciously  perceived  infor-
mation  will  translate  into  behavioural  effects  that  are 
absent if the same information is sufficiently dissimilar 
from the searched-for features. As the action plan has to 
be set up in advance of masked stimulus presentation, 
this situation is an instance of an exertion of preemptive 
control. Similar to Ansorge and colleagues, Eckstein and 
Perrig (2007), found masked response priming effects 
in semantic classification tasks only for word categories 
that matched participants’ current classification inten-
tion (e.g., living vs. non-living), but not for categories, 
which were irrelevant to their current classification in-
tention (e.g., pleasant vs. unpleasant).
In  a  related  line  of  research,  Kunde,  Kiesel  and 
Hoffmann  (2003) investigated under which conditions 
novel masked primes, which do not belong to the target 
set,  elicit  response  priming  effects.  As  novel  masked 
primes were never responded to during the course of 
the experiment, they cannot trigger a response based on 
simple S-R associations. Kunde et al. (2003) therefore 
assume that novel masked primes only elicit response 
priming  effects  when  they  are  implicitly  expected  as 
release condition for a response (“action triggers”). In 
Experiment 1, novel masked primes were numerically 
embedded by the consciously presented target numbers 
(e.g., the primes 2 and 3 in the context of the targets 1 
and 4) and thus implicitly expected as potential action 
triggers. In this experiment, reliable response priming 
effects  were  obtained  for  primes  from  the  target  set 
and also for novel primes. In Experiment 2, in contrast, 
novel prime numbers were not embedded by the target 
numbers (e.g., the primes 1 and 2 in the context of the 
targets 3 and 4) and were consequently not expected as 
action release conditions. In line with their assumptions, 
Kunde et al. (2003) observed response priming only for 
primes from the target set, but not for novel primes. 
The  effects  of  intention  and  expectancy  on  masked 
response priming support the postulated gating frame-
work. Intentions or expectations configure the cognitive 
system by establishing an intention-congruent process-
ing pathway mapping a particular stimulus or stimulus 
dimension with a response and by blocking other path-
ways not matching the intention. As a consequence, only 
unconsciously perceived masked stimuli, which match 
current intentions, are able to trigger motor responses.
While the influence of intentions on masked response 
priming is well documented, the effects of intentions or 
task sets on unconscious masked semantic priming have 
been rarely investigated. The dependency of semantic 
priming on intentions or task-sets is also less straight 
forward than for response priming, because semantic 
priming  is  based  on  highly  overlearned  associations 
between concepts and does not require the intention-
based formation of S-R mappings during the course of 
the experiment. For that reason, the gating mechanism 
must  serve  a  different  purpose  in  semantic  priming 
than in response priming although the basic principles 
may remain the same. In response priming, the gat-
ing mechanism is responsible for establishing a specific 
S-R mapping. In semantic priming, in contrast, the gat-
ing  mechanism  opens  or  blocks  processing  pathways 
dedicated to semantic stimulus processing. At present, 
evidence for a modulation of semantic priming by task 
sets comes mainly for visible prime processing: It has 
been shown that task sets imposed on prime processing 
modulate semantic priming effects even in conditions 
that emphasize automatic over strategic priming proc-
esses: When an orienting task does not require reading 
or semantic analysis of the prime, but instead a per-
ceptual analysis of the letters forming the prime word, 
semantic priming is reduced or absent (Chiappe, Smith, 
& Besner, 1996; Mari-Beffa, Valdes, Cullen, Catena, & 
Houghton, 2005). Some studies even found semantic 
negative priming (e.g., Mari-Beffa, Houghton, Estevez, 
&  Fuentes,  2000).  These  results  are  in  line  with  the 
assumption  of  the  gating  framework  proposed  here: 
Task sets evoke a gating mechanism that enhances and 
blocks  processing  pathways,  thereby  optimizing  task-
related information processing. 
It  remains  an  open  question  whether  such  effects 
of task sets generalize to priming from unconsciously 
perceived  masked  words.  With  masked  priming,  the 
modulation  of  automatic  semantic  processing  can  be 
studied without any contamination by strategic mecha-
nisms. In order to address this question, Kiefer (2006) 
modified the attentional cuing paradigm described above 
and presented a visible word either shortly before the 
masked prime (short CPI) or a longer time before (long 
CPI). Participants were instructed to perform two dif-Top-down modulation of ‘automatic’ processes 
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ferent tasks on these visible words in order to induce a 
semantic or perceptual task set prior to the presentation 
of the masked prime. Participants had to perform a se-
mantic task on this word (living/non-living decision) or 
a perceptual task (Does the first/last letter of this word 
has  a  closed  or  open  shape).  Task  switching  studies 
showed that activated task sets persist for a longer time 
interval (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Meiran, 2000) 
and can even mediate unconscious response priming ef-
fects in the presence of a dominant competing task set 
(Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2007a). For that reason, 
it was assumed that the task set, which is induced by 
the first word (semantic vs. perceptual task set), would 
be active for a short period of time and could influence 
the processing of the subsequently presented masked 
prime  through  the  gating  mechanism  postulated  in 
the previous section. I therefore hypothesized that the 
induced task set is able to modulate masked priming 
effects. Only a semantic task set, but not the percep-
tual task set should open the processing stream for se-
mantic analysis of the unconsciously perceived masked 
prime. Therefore, I expected masked semantic priming 
only when a semantic task was performed immediately 
before masked prime presentation. This prediction was 
largely upheld: Masked semantic priming effects in the 
behavioural and ERP data were largest for a semantic 
task set and smallest for a perceptual task set at the 
short CPI. At the long CPI, masked semantic priming 
effects recovered somewhat for the perceptual task set, 
but were reduced for a semantic task set, possibly due 
to an inhibition mechanism. As the tasks inducing the 
semantic and perceptual task sets differed with regard 
to general task difficulty, the results have to be consid-
ered as preliminary. Nevertheless, they are suggestive 
of the existence of a top-down gating mechanism which 
orchestrates  the  unconscious  automatic  processing 
stream in congruency with higher-level action goals and 
intentions.
Top-down control of automatic priming effects is also 
exerted when unconscious stimuli prime response ten-
dencies that increase the probability of committing an 
error (Jaśkowski et al. 2003; Wolbers, Schoell, Verleger, 
Kraft,  McNamara,  Jaśkowski  et  al.,  2006).  In  such  a 
situation,  top-down  control  is  reactively  engaged  in 
response to the consciously perceived errors. However, 
with  regard  to  the  unconsciously  perceived  masked 
prime top-down control can be considered as preemp-
tive because top-down mechanisms have to be set up 
in  advance  to  masked  prime  presentation.  Jaśkowski 
et al. (2003) found that the magnitude of masked re-
sponse priming effects depended on the proportion of 
incompatible trials (i.e., trials in which prime and target 
were associated with different motor responses). A high 
proportion  of  incompatible  trials,  which  increases  the 
probability of committing an error, resulted in reduced 
masked response priming effects in comparison to a low 
proportion of incompatible trials. Jaśkowski et al. (2003) 
argue that unconscious response priming processes are 
under the observer’s strategic control, presumably as a 
function of the openly observable error frequency. ERP 
effects suggested that top-down control modulated sen-
sory processing of the masked prime in the ventral path-
way as well as response-related processing in the dorsal 
pathway. In line with the postulated gating framework 
outlined above, these findings suggest that a top-down 
gating mechanism is evoked when unconscious priming 
fosters unwanted response tendencies. This mechanism 
suppresses sensory prime processing as well as further 
automatic response preparation.
fuTure sTeps
The studies reviewed so far clearly show that automatic 
processes  elicited  by  unconsciously  perceived  stimuli 
depend  on  a  top-down  configuration  of  the  cognitive 
system.  These  findings  support  the  assumption  of 
refined theories of automaticity and are in clear con-
tradiction with classical theories of automaticity which 
conceptualized automatic processes as being independ-
ent of cognitive resources and other top-down factors. 
The studies described in this article demonstrate that 
automatic processes depend on temporal attention, task 
sets and intention. I propose that these top-down influ-
ences on automatic processing can be accounted for by 
a gating framework which has been successfully applied 
to explain top-down attentional effects on the strategic 
processing of visible stimuli. Despite the considerable 
progress during the last years, we are only at the begin-
ning of this new and exiting field of research. Future 
research is clearly needed to elucidate empirical phe-
nomena and to develop a concise theory. I believe that 
the following steps have to be taken in future work.
At a theoretical level, the postulated gating frame-
work needs further elaboration. The proposed gating 
mechanism  which  configures  the  cognitive  system 
in  congruency  with  the  current  goals  and  intentions 
has to be refined. In particular, formal computational 
modeling is required in order to ensure that the gating 
framework is indeed able to account for all empirical 
phenomena of top-down modulation. The neural net-
work  model  by  Hamker  (2005)  which  has  been  de-
veloped to explain attentional modulation of sensory 
processing of visible stimuli might be a good starting 
point. In this context, the interesting question emerges 302
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whether  a  unitary  type  of  gating  mechanism  is  able 
to account for top-down modulation effects on visible 
stimuli as well as on unconsciously perceived masked 
stimuli. If so, this would suggest that conscious and 
unconscious perception is governed by the same set of 
processing principles.
At  an  empirical  level,  the  generality  of  top-down 
modulation  has  to  be  determined.  Firstly,  it  is  an 
open  question  whether  all  different  kinds  of  higher 
level  factors  discussed  in  the  literature  of  attention 
and controlled processes (temporal and spatial atten-
tion,  attention  to  stimulus  dimensions,  expectations, 
intentions, goals, task sets) exhibit similar modulatory 
influences on automatic processes. An answer to this 
question would not only elucidate top-down influences 
on automatic processing, it would also help to refine 
and to differentiate these partly interrelated concepts 
of  top-down  influences.  Hence,  although  interesting 
in itself, the investigation of top-down modulations on 
automatic processes might also be used as a research 
tool to assess fine-grained consequences of top-down 
factors on the configuration of the information process-
ing system.
Secondly,  to  date  the  influences  of  task  sets  on 
automatic  processes  elicited  by  unconsciously  per-
ceived stimuli have only been substantiated in masked 
semantic  priming.  However,  it  is  not  clear  whether 
other forms of priming (response priming, attentional 
priming, perceptual priming, phonological priming) or 
automatic processes are similarly susceptible to modu-
lation by task sets. At present, one study, which inves-
tigated the influence of task sets on masked response 
priming, failed to obtain any effect, admittedly under 
relatively specific dual task conditions (Experiment 3 
of Ansorge, 2004). However, evidence for priming of 
task-sets could not be obtained. Conversely, the influ-
ence of intentions on automatic processes elicited by 
unconsciously perceived stimuli has only been assessed 
within  the  response  priming  paradigm  so  far  (e.g., 
Ansorge et al., 2002; Ansorge & Neumann, 2005). It 
is possible that different forms of unconscious priming 
depend on automatic processing pathways which differ 
with regard to their sensitivity to top-down influences. 
This line of research would help to address the question 
whether or not automatic processes demonstrate the 
same properties irrespective of the involved cognitive 
and brain systems.
Thirdly,  automatic  processes  can  in  principle  be 
triggered by both unconsciously perceived and con-
sciously  perceived  stimuli.  It  is  an  open  question 
whether properties of automatic processes differ when 
triggered by consciously and unconsciously perceived 
stimuli, respectively. On the one hand there is evi-
dence that automatic processes are governed by the 
same computational principles independent of wheth-
er they are triggered by unconsciously perceived or 
consciously  perceived  stimuli:  At  short  SOAs,  the 
time course of response priming is indistinguishable 
for  consciously  and  unconsciously  perceived  primes 
suggesting similar underlying mechanisms (Vorberg, 
Mattler,  Heinecke,  Schmidt,  &  Schwarzbach,  2004). 
Moreover,  automatic  processes  triggered  by  con-
sciously perceived stimuli also seem to be modulated 
top-down: Interference effects which depend on the 
suppression of automated response tendencies such 
as the Stroop (Allport et al., 1994) or Simon effects 
(Hommel,  1993)  vary  as  a  function  of  participants’ 
intentions. On the other hand, top-down mechanisms 
might differ for conscious and unconscious stimulus 
presentations. As described above, conscious stimulus 
presentation allows for both preemptive and reactive 
control of stimulus processing whereas during uncon-
scious stimulus presentation only preemptive control 
can be exerted. It should be noted, however, that it 
might  be  difficult  to  assess  automatic  processes  in 
isolation by using consciously perceived stimuli. With 
consciously perceived stimuli a co-occurrence of both, 
automatic and strategic processes is probably the rule 
(Koivisto, 1998) rather than the exception (for a simi-
lar argument, see Jacoby, 1991).
Fourthly, the functional and neuroanatomical archi-
tecture of the postulated gating mechanism has to be 
further characterized. At a functional level, the more 
fine-grained  details  of  the  gating  mechanism  have 
to be specified. For instance, future research should 
clarify the possible contribution of active inhibition of 
task-irrelevant information to the gating mechanism. 
At a neurophysiological level, ERP studies are useful 
in  order  to  determine  the  temporal  course  of  top-
down  influences.  Studies  with  functional  magnetic 
resonance  imaging  (fMRI)  are  needed  to  identify 
the brain areas exerting top-down control (presum-
ably prefrontal areas) and those being the target of 
control (presumably posterior sensory areas). While 
functional neuroimaging studies provide information 
at the system level, single cell recording studies in 
behaving animals can shed light on the fine-grained 
aspects of the postulated gating mechanism. In par-
ticular, they can provide information about response 
properties of neurons in sensory brain areas under 
different top-down influences. While gain modulation 
of visual neurons by attention has been documented 
(e.g. Treue & Martínez Trujillo, 1999), corresponding 
evidence  with  regard  to  the  modulatory  influences Top-down modulation of ‘automatic’ processes 
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of goals, intention and task set is lacking so far. This 
information,  in  turn,  may  help  to  validate  and  to 
refine  the  proposed  gating  framework  of  top-down 
modulation.
Notes
1 At this place, I enclose the word “automatic” in apos-
trophes in order to indicate that I do not use this term 
in the sense of classical theories of “automaticity”. For 
simplicity reasons, I omit the apostrophes in the re-
mainder of the text.
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